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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

LAW CLE K

JON WAKELUM, an individual; and Mn~(]3±,;---+)-RESSLER, an individual doing business as
)
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION
M&M RE Holdings,
)
TO AUGMENT THE RECORD
)
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Supreme Court Docket No. 36940-200~
)
v.
Canyon County Docket No. 2008-8465
)
)
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man,
Defendant-Third Party PlaintiffRespondent,
and
BULLOCK AND COMPANY REALTORS
L.L.c., an Idaho limited liability company,

SCOTT BULLOCK, an individual, BILL
DOWNS AUCTION SERVICE INC., an
Idaho corporation, and LARRY DOWNS, an
individual,

,.1

Defendants-Third Party DefendantsRespondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

A STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD PURSUANT TO LA.R. 30 was fiIt
counsel for the parties on March 16, 2010. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORI
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the document listed b{
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:

I,
IIIi

I

1. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Hagood's Motion for Summar;
Judgment, file-stamped July 9,2009.
. fA tDATED this ~ day of March 2010.
For the Supreme Court

I'

AUGMENTATIO

I

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
cc : Counsel of Record

GRANT

G STIPULATIO TO AUG ME T THE RECORD - Docket o. 36940-21

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
JON W AKELUM, an individual; and MIKE
RESSLER, an individual doing business as
M&M RE Holdings,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmalTied man,
Defendant-Third Party PlaintiffRespondent,

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING RENEWED
SECOND STIPULATION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 36940-2009
Canyon County Docket No. 2008-8465

)

)
and
BULLOCK AND COMPANY REALTORS
L.L.c. , an Idaho limited liability company,

SCOTT BULLOCK, an individual, BILL
DOWNS AUCTION SERVICE INC., an
Idaho corporation, and LARRY DOWNS, an
individual,
Defendants-Third Party DefendantsRespondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

An ORDER DENYING STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD was issued by
this Court on April 7, 2010 denying the request to augment the record as the documents submitted
did not bear the file stamp of the district court as required by I.AR. 30(a)
A RENEWED SECOND STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD PURSUANT
TO I.AR. 30 was filed by counsel for Respondent Thomas A Hagood on April 13, 2010.
Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's RENEWED SECOND STIPULATION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall
include the documents listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1. Motion to Amend Complaint, file-stamped November 26, 2008; and
2. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Complaint, file-stamped November 26,
2008.

ORDER GRANTING RENEWED SECOND STIPULATION TO AUGMENT TV""
Docket No. 36940-2009

-

. t-

DA TED this

1-0

day of April 2010.

For the Supreme Court

6feftM ra~
Stephen W. Kenyon, CI1fk

cc: Counsel of Record

ORDER GRANTING RENEWED SECOND STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORDDocket No. 36940-2009
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Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar 10# S043)
Angela. M. Reed (ro State Bar (1)# 7221)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701 "2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300

CANYON COUNTY CLERK

M BECK. OEPUTY

S:\Cl.tENTS\I 0292\ 1\Motion to Amend ComplAint. DOC

Attorneys for John Wakelum and Mike Ressler
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
JON WAKELUM, an individual; and MIKE
RESSLER, an individual doing business as
"M&M RE Holdings",
Plaintiffs

Case No, CV 08-8465

MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

v.
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man,
Defendant.
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man,
Third Party Plaintiff,

v.
BULLOCK AND COMPANY REALTORS
L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability company,
SCOTT BULLOCK, an individual, BILL
DOWNS AUCTION SERVICE INC., an Idaho
corporation, and Scott Bullock, an individual
and LARRY DOWNS, an individual,
Third Party Defendants.

EXHIBIT
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 1
M

page 5 of 24

COMES NOW,

Plaintiffs~

Jon Wakelum and Mike Ressler, by and through their

attorneys of record, Givens Pursley

Lf.,P~

hereby moves this Court for

al1

order allowing

amendment of this complaint to the form attached hereto (changes from original Complaint
indicated by redlining). This Motion is made and based upon Rules 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil IJrocedure and the interests of justice and the Memorandum in SUpp011 of the Matioll to
Amend, which is filed contemporaneously herewith.
DATED this 2l~ay of November, 2008.

Thomas E. Dvorak
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

MonON TO AMI~Nf) COMPLAINT· 2

Page 6 of 24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 6<?'/dUY of November, 200B, I caused to be served a true
and conect copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,. and addressed to the following:

Jay Gustavsen
Davison, Copple. Copple & C()X
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
199 North Capitol Blvd.
1>.0. Box 1583

v-

U,S. Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
~ Hand Delivery
~Fax

Boise, Idaho 83701

Phillip J. CoUaer
Anderson, Juliall & Hull, LLP
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83 707 ~ 7426

U.S. Mail
Overnight Mail
_
Hand Delivery
.-X-Fax

Terry Michaelson
Hamilton Michaelson & Hitty, LLP
1303 12th Avenue Road
P.O, Box 65

_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery

~~

U.S. Mail

~Fax

Nampa, ID 83653·0065

Thomas E. Dvorak

MOTION TO AMltND COMl'tAlNT ·3
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CANYON COUNTY
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A.k )~39M.
NOV 262008../

Thomas E. Dvorak (10 State Bar TD# $043)
Angela M. Reed (10 State Bar lD# 7221)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Bojse~ Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
M BECK, DEPUTY

S:\CLlENTS\10292\1\Mcmo in Support ofMtn to Amend.DOC

Attorneys for John Wakelum and Mike Ressler
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR mE COUNTY OF CANYON
JON WAKELUM, an individual; and MIKE
RESSLER, an individual doing business as
"M&M RE Holdings",
Plaintiffs

Case No. CV 08-8465

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

v.
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man,
Defendant.
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man,
Third Party Plaintiff,

v.
BULLOCK AND COMPANY REALTORS
L.L.C.; an Idaho Hmited liability company,
SCOTT BULLOCK, an individual, BILL
DOWNS AUCTION SERVICE INC., an Idaho
corporation, and Scolt Bullock, an individual
and LARRY DOWNS. an individual,
Third Party Defendants.

EXHIBIT
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT -

1

I~
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)

COMES NOW, Plaintiffs,

JOll

Wakelum and Mike Ressler, by and through their

attorneys of record, Givens Pursley

LU·,

flnd submit this Memorandum in Support of Motion to

Amend Complaint.

This case arises out of an absolute auction sale. which was held by

Defendant Hagood through his agents, the other defendants. At the conclusion of the sale,
Defendant Hagood refused to proceed forward and sign a Memorandum of Sale. Defendant
Hagood has, in his answer in this matter and now in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for

Summary Judgment, taken the position of the Idaho Statute of Frauds, Idaho Code Section 28·
12-20 I, bars the enforcement of the sale because he did not sign a sufficient written
memorandum. Purely out of an abundance of caution, and in the event the court determines that
Hagood's position is correct. the Plaintiffs desire to protect their right a recovery and therefore

seek to amend their claim to add a claim under the Idaho Consumer Pl'Otcction Act.
The Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Ida.ho Code Section

48~60 1,

at. saq., basically

prohibits acts or practices that are misleading, false or deceptive to the consumer. The act itself
does not define consumer, but consumer is defined in the regulations to include:
"a person who purchases, lease, 01' rents, or solicits a purchase,
lease. rent or otherwise give consideration for any goods or
services."

LD.A .P.A. Rule 04.02.01.020.13. Persons are defined to include:
"natural persons, corporations, both foreign and domeslic~
companies, business entities, trusts, partnerships, both limited and
general, associations, both incorporated/unincorporated, and any
othel' legal entity or group associating fact, although not a legal
entity, or any agent or assign, heir, employee, representative, or
servant thereof."
I.D.A.P.A. Rule 04.02.01(38).

Goods as defined by the act include real property. Idaho Code Section

48~602(6).

In its

broadest sense, the Consumer Protection Act prohibits acts that are deceptive to a buyer. If it is

MI': MonANJ)lIM IN StJI)I'OIU OF MOTION TO AMltNn COMPLAINT ~ 2

v

Page 23 of 2£

found in this case that the Idaho Statute of Frauds prohibits holding an absolute auction unless,
as Defendant IIagood contends!

fl

written binding sales contract is signed after the factj then

advertising in an absolute auction could constitute a deceptive trade practice under the Consumer
Pwtection Act. Accordingly, leave to amel1d the complaint to plead such a claim is appropriate,
DATED this

2-?.. Zy of November! 2008.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

drA

~~yy
Trromas E. Dvorak
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

MEMOf~AN:I)\JM IN SlWl'ORT OF MOTION TO AMEN!) COMPI-AINT - 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this _2$'~ay of November, 2008, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Jay Gustavsen
Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
199 North Capitol Blvd.
P.O. Box 1583
Boise. Idaho 83701

U.S. Mail
___ Overnight Mail
_
Hand Delivery

-y-Fax

Phillip J. Collacr
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707~7426

U.S. Mail
._ _ Overnight Mail
-;-T- Hand Deli very

Terry Michaelson
Hamilton Michaelson & Hilty, LLP
1303 12th Avenue Road
P.O. Box 65
Nampa, ID 83653-0065

U.S. Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Deli very

~Fax

_~Fax

TI)(~mas E. D orak

MEMOI~ANf)UM IN Sm'PORI' 0',' MOTION TO

AM.:ND COMPl.AJN'f - 4

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
JON WAKELUM, an individual; and Mn~(+E:----+)-RESSLER, an individual doing business as
)
M&M RE Holdings,
)
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION
)
TO AUGMENT THE RECORD
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
)
Supreme Court Docket No. 36940-2009
v.
)
Canyon County Docket No. 2008-8465
)
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man,
Defendant-Third Party PlaintiffRespondent,
and
BULLOCK AND COMPANY REALTORS
L.L.c., an Idaho limited liability company,

SCOTT BULLOCK, an individual, BILL
DOWNS AUCTION SERVICE INC., an
Idaho corporation, and LARRY DOWNS, an
individual,
Defendants-Third Party DefendantsRespondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

A STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD PURSUANT TO LA.R. 30 was filed by
counsel for the parties on March 16,2010. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be,
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the document listed below,
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Hagood's Motion for Summary
Judgment, file-stamped July 9,2009 .
• fA

I-

DATED this ~ day of March 2010.
For the Supreme Court

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
cc: Counsel of Record

,

. I

JUl 092009
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J ORAKE, OEPUTY

Thomas E. Dvorak (ID State Bar ID# 5043)
Angela M. Reed eID State Bar ID# 7221)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
6073%_1

Attorneys/or John Wakelurn and Mike Ressler

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
JON WAKELUM, an individual; and MIKE
RESSLER, an individual doing business as
"M&M RE Holdings",

Case No. CV 08-8465
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs
v.
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man,
Defendant.
THOMAS A. HAGOOD, an unmarried man,
Third Party Plaintiff,

v.
BULLOCK AND COMPANY REALTORS
L.L.C., an Idaho limited liability company,
SCOTT BULLOCK, an individual, BILL
DOWNS AUCTION SERVICE INC., an Idaho
corporation, and Scott Bullock, an individual
and LARRY DOWNS, an individual,
ThirdP

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN opposmON TO
DEFENDANT HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- PAGE I

I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Jon Wakelum ("Wakelum") and Mike Ressler ("Ressler"), by and through their
attorneys of record, Givens Pursley

LLP,

submit this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant

Thomas Hagood's ("Hagood") Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, which seeks a
judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' Idaho Consumer Protection Act ("ICPA") claim. For
the reasons set forth herein, Hagood is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' ICPA
claim because:
•

Defendants representations in the auction materials that were disseminated to the
public in advance of the auction sale were separate from Hagood's promise to
convey the Property; and

•

Plaintiffs are seeking damages under the ICPA designed to compensate Plaintiffs
for Defendants violations of the ICPA.

II.
A.

DISCUSSION

Hagood's Reliance on the Keriotis, Canell, and Zager Cases is Misplaced Because
the Source of Plaintiffs' ICPA Claim against the Defendants Is Derived From False
Representations Regarding the Auction Sale that Were Made By the Defendants
Before the Oral Contract Between Plaintiffs and Hagood was Consummated and
Because Plaintiffs Are Not Seeking Contract Damages.
Hagood contends that Plaintiffs' ICPA claim should be dismissed because Plaintiffs are

indirectly attempting to recover damages predicated upon Hagood's breach ofthe oral contract
that was consummated between Plaintiffs and Hagood at the absolute auction sale of Hagood's
property.

To support this contention, Hagood primarily relies on the out of state cases of

Keriotis v. Lombardo Rental Trust, 607 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Civ. App. Tex. 1980) and Canel/ v.
Arcola Housing Corp., 65 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1953). Keriotis and Canel/, however, when analyzed
in connection with their progeny, are distinguishable from the instant case because the
misrepresentations about the nature of the auction in the instant case were collateral, or separate
and apart from, to Hagood's breach of his promise to convey. In other words, the deceptive

PLAJNTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN opposmoN TO
DEFENDANT HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 2

statement made regarding the nature of the auction was distinct from the contract to convey the
Property the Court has ruled unenforceable.

1.

Keriotis and Its Progeny

In Keriotis, which was a 1980 decision out of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, the
plaintiff brought an action against the defendants under the Texas Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act ("TTPCP A") for damages arising out of an alleged oral misrepresentation that
defendants would sell a certain parcel of real estate to the plaintiff.

607 S. W.2d at 45.

According to the plaintiff, the plaintiff approached the defendants to inquire whether they would
be interested in selling their property. The Defendants subsequently wrote a letter to plaintiff
stating that the price was acceptable, but refused to finance the transaction. Plaintiff took no
further action regarding the transaction until he leamed that the property had been sold to a thirdparty for $105,000. Plaintiff thereafter commenced a suit against the defendants alleging that the
defendants had represented that the real estate in question would be sold to plaintiff for $75,000
and that defendants' sale to the third-party, therefore, violated the TTPCPA. ld. Plaintiff sought
damages for the difference between the $75,000 price allegedly promised and the $105,000
received by the defendants.
After analyzing relevant Texas case law, the Court concluded that the nature of the
damages sought and the relationship of the promise to the purposes of the statute of frauds
controlled application of the statute of frauds. The Court went on to hold that "both the alleged
misrepresentation and the damages sought supported the conclusion that plaintiff is attempting to
recover damages for failure to perform an oral promise governed by the statute of frauds." ld. at
46. Importantly, in reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that its conclusion may have been
different if plaintiff's suit was predicated on the existence of a collateral representation separate
from the promise to convey. ld.
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN opposrrlON TO
DEFENDANT HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 3

The reach of the Keriotis court's holding was subsequently clarified by the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas in McClure v. Duggan, 674 F. Supp. 211 (1987)
(applying Texas law). In McClure, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant alleging that
the defendant breached an agreement to sell a race horse to the plaintiff and that the defendants
actions violated Texas' Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("TDTPA"). [d. at 213. The plaintiff,
McClure, contacted the defendant, Duggan, who was a European race horse broker, and told him
he desired to purchase a European race horse. Id. at 214.

The parties thereafter met and

discussed the proposed terms of sale. Duggan advised McClure the purchase price for the horse,
which was located in Ireland, would be $600,000.00 and that Duggan's veterinarian in Ireland
has pronounced the horse "sound." Following this conversation, McClure alleged that they
entered into an oral agreement whereby McClure would purchase the horse for $600,000.00
subject to the condition precedent that McClure's veterinarian would examine the horse in
California and that McClure had the right to reject the horse if his veterinarian did not pronounce
the horse "sound." Duggan denied that the parties had an agreement. McClure further alleged
that Duggan later called him and told him not to wire the money because the horse would not
''vet.'' Id. Duggan also denied making this statement. Ultimately, McClure did not tender the
money, Duggan later sold the horse to another purchaser, and the horse won the Hollywood
Derby conferring $175,000.00 in winnings on its new owner. Id. at 215. McClure brought suit
against Duggan, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, fraud, and TDTP A violations. Id. at 214.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, applying Texas law,
held that the oral agreement between McClure and Duggan did not satisfy the statute of frauds
and was, therefore, unenforceable. Id. at 219. As to McClure's fraud and TDTPA claims,
Duggan argued that even if he made the alleged misrepresentation that ''the horse would not vet,"
McClure's fraud and DPTA claims, which were based on this statement, were barred by the
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 4

statute of frauds because those claims were in essence based on an unenforceable oral agreement.

ld. at 220. The Court rejected this argument, holding that that McClure's fraud and DPTA
claims were not barred by the statute of frauds as a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court distinguished the case sub judice from Collins v. McCombs, 511 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974), which is heavily relied upon by the Keriotis court, and deserves attention here.
In Collins, the plaintiff and the defendant, as joint ventures, operated a train ride in an
amusement park. Id. at 745-746. The defendant, who financed the business, and the plaintiff,
who managed the business and drew a salary, orally agreed that they held a 60% and a 40%
ownership interest in the business, respectively. ld. They also orally agreed that before plaintiff
was entitled to a share of the profits, defendant would recover his initial investment in the first
three years. ld. at 746. After managing the business for three years, plaintiff requested his share
of the profits. Defendant refused plaintiff's request and said it was never his intention to allocate
a share of the business to plaintiff. Plaintiff brought suit seeking recovery of his share of the
profits.

ld.

The Texas Court of Civil Appeals upheld the trial court's decision granting

defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that plaintiffs fraud claim was barred by the
statute of frauds because plaintiff was seeking to recover what he would have gained had the
promise been performed and that the gist of his cause of action was breach of the unenforceable
promise. ld. at 747.
After analyzing the Collins decision, the McClure court clarified the holding in Collins:
The . . . Collins decision[] stand[s] for the proposition that an
unenforceable oral agreement cannot be the sole basis for an action
sounding in fraud.
When an oral agreement is rendered
unenforceable by the statute of frauds, a purchaser cannot sustain
an action for fraud by merely alleging that the seller made an oral
promise without the intention of performing it.

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 5

£

Id. at 221.

The _McClure court then went on to hold that Duggan's reliance on the Collins

decision was misplaced:
Duggan's reliance upon [the Collins case] is misplaced. The
allegations contained in McClure's Complaint demonstrate that
McClure's fraud claim is not based upon false oral promises
but upon factual misrepresentations which were made
collateral to the unenforceable agreement. A review of Texas
law indicates that an important distinction must be made before it
is summarily concluded that McClure has disguised his
unenforceable contract claim in the form of a tort action. The
distinction is this: If the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations
were purely promissory, then a tort claim is barred by the statute of
frauds; if the representations were factual, however, the plaintiff
may seek recovery under a tort theory.
Id. (emphasis added). The McClure court further found the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Sibley v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 36 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1931) particularly instructive.

In Sibley, defendant Kern Lumber Company and its co-defendant stockholder and officer,
Sibley, exchanged twenty-two houses and lots for land owned by Southland Life Insurance
Company.

Id.

In the transaction, Sibley falsely represented that each of the houses was

improved with brick veneer and had shown the insurance company twenty-two houses with brick
veneer; however, one of the houses Sibley showed the insurance company and represented as
being on Lot 7, which was a lot included in the transaction, was actually Lot 6, which was not
included in the transaction.

Lot 7 was vacant. Id. at 145-146. Sibley also promised that

construction, which was underway, would be completed. Id. at 145. The insurance company
brought suit against Sibley and Kern for the cost of completing construction and for the
difference in value between Lots No. 6 and 7.

Id. at 146.

representations were barred by the statute of frauds.

Sibley argued that his oral

The Texas Supreme Court disagreed,

concluding that the statute of frauds was not a defense to the insurer's fraud action. Id. The
McClure court summarized the Sibley decision as follows:

PLAINTlFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 6

wrr

The plaintiffs action in Sibley was not based upon the
defendant's failure to convey the land but rather upon the
representations made collateral to the purchase contract . . .
Since Sibley's misrepresentations were factual and made apart
from any promise to remain secondarily liable, the Texas Supreme
Court concluded that the statute of frauds was not a defense to the
tort action of fraud.
McClure, 674 F. Supp. at 222 (emphasis added).
Based on its analysis of the Collins and Sibley decisions, the McClure court held:
Here, in the instant case, Duggan's aJleged misrepresentations
are separate and aside from the underlying oral agreement to
sell Foscarini [the horse). If all McClure alleged was that
Duggan had no intention of performing his oral promise to sell
Foscarini when the promise was made, then in accordance with the
holdings of Wade and Collins, McClure's fraud claim would be
barred by the statute of frauds as a matter of law. But McClure
alleges more than just an underlying intent not to perform an
unenforceable oral agreement. McClure alleges that Duggan
made a misrepresentation independent of the unenforceable
oral agreement. McClure alleges that Duggan stated Foscarini
would not "vet," when in fact the horse was capable of passing a
veterinarian examination. Such facts as whether Duggan made this
statement, whether it was true, or whether negotiations had
progressed to such a point that the statement could be considered a
condition precedent to the sale of Foscarini are all heavily
disputed. Disputed facts when considered upon a motion for
summary judgment must be resolved in the nonmovant's favor.

ld. (emphasis added).

2.

Cannel and Its Progeny

In addition to McClure, Hagood also cites the Florida Supreme Court's decision in
Cannel v. Arcola Housing Corp. for the proposition that Plaintiffs' claims under the ICPA are
barred by the statute of frauds. However, Hagood's isolated interpretation of Cannel, like his
isolated interpretation of Keriotis, does not reflect the status of Florida's jurisprudence on the
tort/statute of frauds issue. The following brief summary of Cannel and its progeny shows that

PLAINTIFFS' MEMOR<\NDUM IN opposmON TO
DEFENDANT HAGOOD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 7

Ii?

If

Florida courts are drawing similar conclusions to those reached in the Texas cases discussed
above.

In Cannel, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant housing corporation, fraudulently
told the plaintiffs, during negotiations leading up to the sale of certain lots, that the lots that were
eventually purchased by plaintiffs would be proximate to certain beach facilities and that the
proximity of these facilities to their lots would increase the value of their lots. l 65 So.2d at 850.
The corporation never constructed the breach facilities and the plaintiffs brought suit alleging (1)
that they would have not paid the price they had for their lots had they known the beach facilities
would not be constructed and (2) that the defendant made the representations regarding the beach
facilities with out any intention to build the facilities. Id. Assuming plaintiffs' allegations to be
true, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the bathing facilities, had they been built, would
have been maintained for the use and benefits of the homeowners and, therefore, that the builder
had essentially agreed to create an easement in or over the land for the benefit of the
homeowners.

Id. at 850-851.

Based on this premise, the court held that plaintiffs were

attempting to enforce a mere oral promise to create the easement, which clearly fell within the
statute of frauds and upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint. Id. at 851.
The Florida District Court of Appeals subsequently distinguished the Cannel decision in
Steinberg v. Kearns, 907 So.2d 691 (Fla. Dist. App. 2005). In Steinberg, the owner of an interest
in two restaurants brought an action against the parties to whom he had assigned his interest,
alleging, inter alia, breach of oral contract and fraudulent inducement. /d. at 691. The trial
court, relying Khawly v. Reboul, 488 So.2d 856 (Fla. Dist. App. 1986). which cited Cannel,

IOn page 6 of their Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Hagood, citing to page 850 of
the Cannel decision, states, "[t]he initial complaint in Cannel did not contain any allegations of fraud and was thus
premised solely on breach of contract. Plaintiffs then moved to amend their complaint to add a claim for fraud in
the inducement .... " This procedural history, however, is not located at page 850 of the Cannel decision or
anywhere else in the decision and it is, therefore, unclear where Hagood obtained this information.
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dismissed the plaintiffs fraud claim as being barred by the statute of frauds. Id. at 692. The
Florida appellate court reversed, distinguishing Khawly and Cannel on the basis that those cases
involved situations where the alleged fraudulent representations were part of the contract that,
under the statute of frauds, had to be in writing. The Steinberg court, citing Florida Supreme
Court precedent, explained:
Where a contract exists, a tort action will lie for either intentional
or negligent acts considered to be independent from acts that
breached the contract. Fraudulent inducement is an independent
tort in that it requires proof of facts separate and distinct from the
breach of contract. It normally "occurs prior to tbe contract and
the standard of truthful representation placed upon the
defendant is not derived from the contract.» Steinberg alleges
that appellees, Kearns and Evans, made false representations
about a fact that existed before tbey entered into tbe contract
which induced him to enter into the contract. Tbus, the tort as
alleged is separate and distinct from any breacb of contract
and is not barred by the statute of frauds.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

B.

Plaintiffs' ICPA Claims Are Not Subject to Dismissal Under tbe Texas and Florida
Courts' rationales in McClure and Steinberg Because Plaintiffs' IPCA Claims Are
Predicated on Factual Representations Regarding the Auction Sale that Occurred
Prior To Formation of The Oral Contract that Was Consummated Between Hagood
and Plaintiffs At the Auction Sale.
In Count IV of their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs have alleged:
36.
To the extent the Statute of Frauds or similar law prohibits
or renders void or voidable a sale of real property at "absolute
auction", Defendants conduct in advertising, conducting and
otherwise representing that an absolute auction of the real property
at issue in this case without full disclosure of such prohibition or
potential for a void result violated the Idaho Consumer Protection
Act, Idaho Code Section 48-601, et. seq., and applicable rules
promulgated by the Idaho Attorney General, LD.A.P.A. Rule
04.02.01.01, et. seq., in that it:
a.

Represented that goods or services had characteristics or
qualities that they did not have;
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b.

Constituted an act or practice that is misleading, false or
deceptive to the consumer;

c.

Constituted an initial offer to sell goods or services with
material contingencies, conditions, or qualifications
attendant to the offer without clearly and conspicuously
disclosing such contingencies, conditions or qualifications
(I.D.A.P.A. Rule 40);

d.

Constituted a direct or implied representation that goods or
services could be purchased for a specified price, when that
was not the case (Rule 60).

It is apparent from the allegations in Count IV, that Plaintiffs' ICPA claim is predicated on the
factual representations regarding the nature and terms of the auction sale the Defendants made
before the sale. In the Terms and Conditions Sheet2 that was distributed to the public in advance
of the auction sale, the Defendants made the following representations, among others:
REAL ESTATE TERMS: Property sold Absolute Auction-No
Reserve. Earnest money day of auction: $25,000.00 down on lots 1
& 2; $50,000.00 dov,n on lot 3. Held in trust for 45 days due
diligence, then released non refundable, to seller. Earnest money
applied to purchase price at closing. Non-refundable earnest
money unless defect found in title. 5% buyer's premium. Close
within 30 days after 45 days due diligence. Bidding is not
contingent upon financing and is buyer's responsibility and should
be pre-arranged, if needed, so as to pay cash at closing. Financing
Terms: Owner finance; Owner to carry with 20% down, interest
only payments at 8% due in full 2 years from closing.
APPROVAL OF BID PRICES: Successful bidder and runner-up
bidder will be required to enter into purchase agreement at the
auction site immediately following the close of the auction.
DEED: Seller will provide a warranty deed.
POSSESSION: Possession will be given at closing.
In this Term Sheet and in the other advertisements that were disseminated to the public,3
Defendants represented that Hagood's property would be sold to the highest bidder via "absolute
2 The Terms and Conditions Sheet is attached as Exhibit "8" to the Affidavit of Mike Ressler submitted by Plaintiffs
In Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.
3 One such advertisement is attached as Exhibit "8" to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.
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auction," which as explained in Plaintiffs' prior summary judgment memoranda is a term of art.
This, together with the other advertised terms, was a representation of fact regarding the type of
auction that was to be held and the terms attendant to the auction sale. Like the plaintiff's fraud
claim in McClure, the Plaintiffs' ICPA claim in this case is not based upon Hagood' s failure to
convey the land, but rather upon the representations made in the Term Sheet and advertisements
representing that the property would be sold via absolute auction. In other words, Plaintiffs
ICPA claim is not predicated on representations derived from the oral contract that was
consummated between Hagood and Plaintiffs at the auction sale, which this Court has concluded
is unenforceable under the statute of frauds. Plaintiffs, much like the plaintiffs in Steinberg, are
alleging that the Defendants made deceiving representations about a fact that induced Plaintiffs
to attend the auction sale and submit the highest bid before the contract was actually formed.
These representations, under the standards announced in McClure and Steinberg, are collateral to
or separate from Hagood's breach of his oral promise to convey the property.
Stated differently, the play that is this case consists of three scenes: a pre-auction scene,
an auction scene, and a post-auction scene. Plaintiffs' IePA claim is predicated solely on the
representations the Defendants, including the auctioneer and the realtors, made in the pre-auction
scene in materials they disseminated to the public that induced the Plaintiffs and others to attend
the absolute auction and that were not otherwise modified during the auction scene itself.
Plaintiffs' ICPA claim is not dependent on any representations that were made during the third
scene, namely, the post-auction scene where Hagood breached his promise to convey the real
property to Plaintiffs who were the highest bidders at the auction sale. Plaintiffs' ICPA claim is
analogous to the fraudulent inducement claims in Sibley and Steinberg in that the deceiving
representations Defendants made in the auction materials that were disseminated to the public
were representations that induced the Plaintiffs to attend the sale and enter into an oral contract
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
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with Hagood. Defendants' representation that the property would be sold via "absolute auction"
is, in essence, the same as a car dealer running a television advertisement offering to sale a car at
a stated price to induce prospective car purchasers to its lot and then refusing to sell the car at the
stated price. See IDAPA § 04.02.01.233.08 (noting that it is an unfair and deceptive act or
practice for a dealer to fail to allow consumers to purchase all motor vehicles described by the
advertisement at the advertised price.).
Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts in order for Plaintiffs' ICP A claim to be submitted
to the trier-of-fact. The auction sale that occurred in this case falls within the definition of trade
and commerce in Idaho Code § 48-602(2). Furthermore, the sale of real property falls within the
definition of "goods" under Idaho Code § 48-602(6) and/or "services" under Idaho Code §48602. Additionally, the record before the court creates an issue of fact as to whether the auction
materials the Defendants disseminated to the public advertising the auction as being absolute or
without reserve had a capacity or tendency to deceive consumers. See State ex reI. Kidwell v.
Master Distrib., Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 122 (Idaho 1980) (noting that in order for an act or practice

to be considered unfair under the ICPA, a plaintiff need only show that the act or practice
possesses a tendency or capacity to deceive consumers). The Plaintiffs, who do not have to
show intent to deceive to state a claim under the ICPA, see id. at 122-123, have satisfied this
burden, particularly in light of the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that the ICPA is
to be liberally construed. Fenn v. Noah, 133 P.3d 1240, 1245 (Idaho 2006).

C.

Plaintiffs Are Seeking Damages Under the ICPA, Not Benefit of the Bargain
Contract Damages.
Defendant Hagood's argument that Plaintiffs ICPA claim is merely a guise to seek

benefit of the bargain contract damages should likewise be rejected. As noted above, Plaintiffs
have alleged sufficient facts to pursue a claim under the
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statutorily controlled by Idaho Code § 48-608. Section 48-608 allows a plaintiff who suffers any
ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, to recover actual damages or one
thousand dollars per violation, whichever is greater. The amended complaint pleads exactly that.
The ICPA claim, for reasons discussed above, is a separate claim that stands on its own from the
contract counts Plaintiffs alleged against Hagood, which have been dismissed. If Plaintiffs are
successful on their ICPA claim, they should be entitled to the damages allowed under 48-608 .
Indeed, Hagood acknowledges on page 9 of his summary judgment memorandum that a litigant
is entitled to tort damages if the cause of action truly sounds in tort.

Consistent with this

rationale, where Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state an ICPA claim, Plaintiffs' ICPA
claim stands on its own and Plaintiffs should be entitled to the damages allowed under the ICPA
if Plaintiff s prevail.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny Defendant
Hagood's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this

'1~"y of July, 2009.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Tlfomas E. Dvorak
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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